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IT WOULD seem to be fairly obvious that an action should lie against
an individual, whether a competitor or not, who makes false defamatory
statements about another's character or falsely disparages another's goods.
And so the courts have held for a century or longer, both here and in
England.'
This article proposes to discuss a question whose solution is less ob-
vious. That question is whether, under certain circumstances, derogatory
statements about a business rival should be regarded as unlawful, even
though such statements are trite in fact or merely expressions of opinion.'
To illustrate, should a trader be privileged to "enlighten" customers
about the private life, the personal peculiarities and views of his com-
petitor or to criticize his business policies and his goods?
That these problems constantly intrude in the daily conduct of business
is evidenced by the fact that business men themselves have attempted to
deal with them in "Codes of Fair Practice."' 2 Writers on business ethics
have trtated the subject.' The same questions have given rise to extensive
litigation abroad.' Yet not long ago it would have been largely academic
to discuss them in an American legal periodical. It has been, and still is,
settled beyond challenge that in the absence of statute actions for per-
sonal defamation and for disparagement of goods both presuppose a
false statement.' In the last few years, however, an important develop-
ment has occurred which gives a new aspect to the questions here raised.
Courts have become accustomed to regard defamation of a business
rival and disparagement of his goods as actionable unfair competition.
Said the Court in the recent case of Gardella v. Log Cabin Products Com-
tLecturer in Comparative Law at Columbia University.
1. ODGERS, LIBEL AND SLANDER (6th ed. 1929) 1, 16, 66. NEWELL, SLANDER AND
LIBEL (4th ed. 1924) 1, 197. For the differences between the action for disparagement
of goods and the action for defamation see Handler, Unfair Competition (1936) 21
IOWA L. REv. 175, 197.
2. See infra, p. 1333.
3. SHARP & Fox, BusINEss ETHICS (1937) 141.
4. See infra, pp. 1309, 1317.
5. See ODGmS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 1, 16, 66, 149; NEWELL, op. cit. supra note 1,
at 197, 764; Handler, supra note 1, at 197. For recent cases see Old Dearborn Dis-
tributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp., 288 Ill. App. 79, 5 N. E. (2d) 610 (1937) ;
Alabama Ride Co. v. Vance, 178 So. 438 (Ala. 1938); Pennington v. Little, 266 Ky.
750, 99 S. W. (2d) 776 (1936). New Hampshire seems to be the only jurisdiction
where the common law has been changed by judicial decision. See Ray, Trath: A
Defense to Libel (1932) 16 MINN. L. Rxv. 43, 53.
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pa!ny6 " . . .- a cause of action for unfair competition is stated which
in turn consists of the tort of defamation."
To say that the tort of defamation or of disparagement of goods con-
stitutes an act of unfair competition if committed by a business rival,
invblves more than mere terminology. Earlier, courts had realized that
an injunction is the only effective means of protecting a man's business
from unlawful interferences by his competitors. Therefore, an equitable
remedy has long been granted in actions for unfair competition.' In
actions based upon defamation of character and disparagement of goodc.
on the other hand, a common law rule forbids equitable relief.' Today,
most authorities sanction evasion of this rule where the suit is brought
on the theory of unfair competition. "Where the gravamen of the action
is to enjoin unfair competition, the question of libel and slander is only
incidental to the action, and such an action is not one to enjoin a libel
or slander." 9 And again:" . . . it is . . . the duty of the court of
equity to enjoin unfair competition waged by means of slander, defam-
ation, or misrepresentation of a competitor's goods . "10
6. 89 F. (2d) 891, 895 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
7. WALsr, EQurrY (1930) 214, 221, 234 et seq.
8. Equitable relief against defamation of character as well as disparagement of
goods has been denied on the ground that the constitutional right of free speech would
be violated by giving an injunction. Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige 24, 34 Am. Dec. 363
(N. Y. Ch. 1839); Marlin Fire Arms Co. v. Shields, 171 N. Y. 384, 64 N. E. 163
(1902). See infra, p. 1333. As regards defamation of character the further argument
has been advanced that equity protects only property rights, not personal rights. See
CLARK, EQurry (1919) 311 et seq.; VALSH, EQurrY (1930) 259 ct seq.; Pound, Equitable
Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality (1916) 29 HAv. L. Rnv. 640.
9. Dehydro, Inc. v. Tretolite Co., 53 F. (2d) 273 (N. D. Okla. 1931).
10. Bourjois, Inc. v. Park Drug Co., Inc., 82 F. (2d) 468, 471 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935).
Accord: Allen Mfg. Co. v. Smith, 224 App. Div. 187, 229 N. Y. Supp. 692 (4th Dep't
1928); Old Investors' and Traders' Corp. v. Jenkins, 133 Misc. 213, 232 N. Y. Supp.
245 (Sup. Ct. 1928), aff'd, 225 App. Div. 860, 233 N. Y. Supp. 845 (1st Dep't 1929);
Downes v. Culbertson, 153 Misc. 14, 275 N. Y. Supp. 233 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
- In Willis v. O'Connell, 231 Fed. 1004 (S. D. Ala. 1916), a suit to enjoin a libel
by a non-competitor was dismissed. The Court intimated that the injunction would
tave been permitted had the case involved unfair competition. Cf. Maytag Co. v.
Meadows Mfg. Co., 35 F. (2d) 403 (C. C. A. 7th, 1929) ; Vortex Mfg. Co. v. Ply-Rite
Contracting Co., 33 F. (2d) 302 (D. AiC. 1929); Pure Milk Producers Ass'n v.
Bridges, 68 P. (2d) 658 (Kan. 1937). The recent case of Menard v. Houle, 11 N. E.
(2d) 436 (Mass. 1937) goes even one step further in granting injunctive relief against
a non-competitor. Cf. Saxon Motor Sales, Inc. v. Torino, 2 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 835
(Sup. Ct. 1938); Nims, Unfair Competition by False Statements or Disparagement
(1933) 19 Coax. L. Q. 63, 66; Handler, supra note 1, at 199; Dnmm=G, T.ADE-
MARX PROTECTION AND UNFAIR TRADrN (1936) 137. A recent New Jersey case,
Hollander v. Hollander, 117 N. J. Eq. 578, 177 Att. 80 (1935), where the court, adhering
to the old rule, refused to enjoin a trader from misrepresenting the quality of his rival's
goods, is out of line with the present weight of authority.
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The question decided in these cases was merely that of equitable relief.
But their significance transcends by far the remedial point at issue. Once
it is recognized that a distinction exists between ordinary defamation
and competitive defamation, that competitive defamation constitutes un-
fair competition and calls for more swift and effective redress than
ordinary defamation; the door has been opened for a further inquiry
-- whether, in an action for unfair competition, the substantive law of
defamation should still be controlling. And the same is true of disparage-
ment of goods.
There is evidence that courts already are embarking upon such a
quest.1 Unfair competition is an expanding concept, and affords room for
this adventure. 2 While originally no more than a convenient 'name for
the doctrine that no one may pass off his goods as those of another,
13
the term has, in the last two or three decades, come to be applied to a
variety of other situations.' The copying of news' 4 and phonograph
records' as well as the use of another's trade secrets' have been en-
joined on the ground of unfair competition, although no element of pass-
ing-off was involved.'I Today, false defamation and disparagement are
considered to be unfair competition. As the standards of business be-
havior rise and as judges become more sensitive in appraising competi-
tive conduct, there can be but little doubt that the question will soon come
before the courts whether truthful defamatory statements or expressions
of unfavorable opinion about another's goods or business practices might
not also constitute enjoinable unfair competition.
In anticipation of decided cases we shall now consider whether the
law of unfair competition affords a principle or principles which can
be evoked to protect a business man from the attacks referred to; and,
if it does, what the extent of such protection should be.
11. Cf. Gardella v. Log Cabin Products Co., 89 F. (2d) 891 (C.C.A. 2d, 1937)
where the Court said on page 896: "In cases of disparagement or defamation of property
the common-law rule seems to be that actual damage must be established . . . There
is an indication in the cases, however, that in actions for unfair competition damages
for injury to the reputation of a product may be awarded without proof of actual loss."
Cf. Handler, supra note 1, at 199-200.
12. Fathchild, Static and Dynamic Concepts of the Law of Unfair Competition
(1936) 1 Mo. L. REv. 299, 305.
13. Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 531-532 (1933);
DEaENBERG, op. cit. snpra note 10, at 81; Handler, supra note 1, at 187.
14. International News Service v. The Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215 (1918).
15. Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 Atl. 631 (1937).
16. Colonial Laundries v. Henry, 48 R. I. 332, 138 Atl. 47 (1927). Cf. also Vortex
Mfg. Co. v. Ply-Rite Contracting Co., 33 F. (2d) 302 (D. Md. 1929).
17. See also Federal Trade Commission v. Keppel and Bro., Inc., 291 U. S. 304
(1934), where the court held that "unfair methods of competition" within the meaning of
§ 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act was an expanding concept, A detailed dis-
cussion of this section is beyond the scope of the article.
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The problem here broadly outlined has several phases. Let us begin
with truthful references to a competitor's past conduct.
I.
DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS ABOUT A COMPErITOR'S PAST CONDUCT
Suppose that some time in the past a business man has been punished
for a criminal offense, connected or unconnected with the conduct of his
business, or that he has offended against generally accepted standaidb
of honesty or decency in or outside of his business. And let us further
assume that he has reformed since and has become, or is about to become,
a useful and respectable member of society. Should a competitor be
permitted to expose to customers or prospective customers the past and
all but forgotten misdeeds of his rival? If no other influence intrudes,
self-interest will, as a rule, cause the public to buy from that seller who
offers the best goods or services at the lowest price. But if a com-
petitor informs the public of his rival's misconduct of by-gone days, at-
tention will be diverted from the relative merits of the parties' goods
or services to the personalities of the rival traders-a collateral issue which
does not really concern buyers. By shifting the plane of competition
and appealing to emotion rather than to intelligence the competitor may
sway the public over to his side, where he might otherwise have failed.
Such conduct is unfair to his rival in that it deprives him of the reward
to which he may be entitled by virtue of his superior service. It is also
detrimental to the best interest of the buying public and has, therefore,
all the attributes of enjoinable unfair competition. Any reference to
crime, fraud, dishonesty, immorality, or other disreputable behavior of
by-gone days should fall under the ban of the law when the plaintiff's acts
are unconnected with the present competitive struggle and have no bear-
ing on his present reliability and honesty as a supplier of goods or ser-
vices. This principle should be applied whether the plaintiff's acts had
been committed 20 years, 10 years, 1 year or even less before reference
to them was made.1
8
We have already seen that at common law in civil actions for libel
or slander the truth of the defaniatory words constitutes a complete
defense irrespective of the defendant's motive,"0 and it might be inferred
that public policy favors the unrestricted freedom of one individual to
disseminate truthful defamatory information about another. But in crim-
inal prosecutions for libel, truth is a good defense only if the libel was
18. Cases may arise where the defendant advises customers or prospective customers
of the plaintiff's criminal acts immediately after the trial and conviction. See infra,
p. 1312.
19. Ray, Truth: A Defense to Libel (1932) 16 2dr. L REv. 43, 51.
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published "with good motives and for justifiable ends."20 This affords
a strong indication that public policy today is opposed to, and seeks to
prevent, publication of true defamatory statements except in cases where
there is a valid excuse. And few will deny that a trader cannot be said
to act with "good motives" if he informs prospective customers of his
rival's past transgressions for the sole purpose of gaining a competitive
advantage. When the different rule prevailing in civil actions for libel
is considered in the light of criminal libel law, the conclusion is ines-
capable that the civil rule stands merely for the narrow proposition that
a man should not recover vnoncy damages for an injury to a character
which he does not possess.2' To enjoin the defendant, on the ground of
unfair competition, from disseminating the defamatory matter in the
future would not be in conflict with that policy. Moreover, there is the
very important difference between the law of defamation and the law of
unfair competition that the former protects a man's reputation, while
the latter protects his business. It may, perhaps, be argued that a man's
reputation does not deserve to be protected if the charges of dis-
reputable conduct are true. The argument does not hold where inter-
ference with the plaintiff's business is the theory of relief. The loss of
customers is no less real if caused by true defamatory statements than
it would be if caused by false charges. The rule governing civil actions
for libel and slander affords, therefore, no argument against holding the
truth of the charge to be immaterial in an action for unfair competition.
Analogies in support of this position are not lacking. In Melvin v.
Reid2 2 the suit was for damages for the exhibition of a moving picture
film which accurately depicted incidents in plaintiff's past life, and re-
vealed her true name to the public. The court held for plaintiff on the
ground that her right of privacy had been invaded. It was pointed- out
in vigorous language that the objective of society is to sustain and aid
a person who by his own efforts has rehabilitated himself; no one should
be permitted, for mercenary reasons, to throw such a person back into
a life of shame or crime. This reasoning applies with equal force where
the defendant is a competitor. Melvin v. Reid accords with other holdings
recognizing the right of privacy. Said the court in the leading case of
Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co.,23 "that the law makes the
truth in suits for slander and libel . . . a complete defense may not
necessarily make the publication of the truth the legal right of every
person, nor prevent it from being in some cases a legal wrong." Brandeis
and Warren, in their well-known article on the right of privacy,2 4 state
20. The great majority of the states have constitutional or statutory provisions
to this effect. See Ray, supra note 19, at 47.
21. See POLLOcK, ToRts (13th ed. 1929) 266; Ray, supra note 19, at 55.
22. 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931).
23. 122 Ga. 190, 204, 50 S. E. 68, 74 (1905).
24. Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy (1890) 4 HARV. L. Rav. 193, 218.
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the rule thus: "The truth of the matter published does not afford a
defense. Obviously, this branch of the law should have no concern with
the truth or falsehood of the matters published. It is not for injury
to the individual's character that redress or prevention is sought, but
for injury to the right of privacy."25
It might perhaps be argued that a suit based on the right of privacy
provides the proper relief against competitive defamation. Although there
appear to be no cases on the point, it is conceivable that this position
might find favor with some courts. But apart from the fact- that the
right of privacy is recognized only in a few jurisdictions and has been
rejected in others,2" it would seem for reasons both of principle and ex-
pediency that the law of unfair competition is the proper basis of relief.
If a trader makes a defamatory statement about a rival to the rival's
customers, the primary purpose is to 'acquire that rival's customers, that
is, to injure his business. It is this injury that the rival will seek to
redress rather than injury to his privacy. Furthermore, it may be diffi-
cult to obtain an injunction on the theory of an invasion of the right of
privacy. The general rule still prevails that equity protects only property
rights,2" and while a more liberal tendency is noticeable,2 there is as yet
not much authority for granting injunctive relief where the injury is to
personality 29 It is well settled, on the other hand, that an injunction will
be granted where a cause of action is shown in unfair competition.30
The argument here advanced for grounding relief on the theory of un-
fair competition has been adopted by German, French and Swiss courts.
The German Unfair Competition Statute of 1909' provides that any per-
son who, in the course of competition, engages in conduct contra bonos
mores (wider die guten Sitten) shall be liable to an injunction and damages
(§1). It is well settled that an action will lie under this provision if a
competitor makes true defamatory statements about a rival's past, pro-
vided that the information so divulged is of no present concern to busi-
25. See also Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S. NV. 967 (1927). For a col-
lection of authorities see HANDLER, CASES AnD MATERIALS Oz TRADE REGULATIOrN
(1937) 800 et seq. Cf. also Los AWGE;ELS BAn Asso. BUL. (1937) 100. Normand, The
Law of Defamation in Scotland (1938) 6 CAim. L. J. 327, 337.
26. See HAID , op. cit. supra note 25, at 801; Moreland, The Right of Privacy
To-day (1931) 19 Ky. L. J. 101.
27. WALsH, EQurry (1930) 266.
28. Cf. Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257, 155 S. E. 194 (1930), (1937)
51 HARv. L. Rv. 166, (1937) 32 ILu. L. REv. 496, (1938) 22 M[mun. L. REv. 566;
Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 195 S. E. 55 (N. C. 1938).
29. Moreland, supra note 26, at 127; Lisle, The Right of Privacy To-day (1931)
19 Ky. L, J. 137, 143.
30. See supra, p. 1305.
31. Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Vettbewerb, Reichsgesetzblatt (1909) 499. For
the history of the Act see Wolff, Non-Competing Goods its Trade-Mar. Lau (1937)
37 Co.. L. Rav. 582, n. 26.
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ness customers. Thus an injunction against repetition was granted where
the defendant had informed a customer (for whose trade he and the
plaintiff were contending) of a criminal offense committed by his business
rival more than eight years before.32
The German courts have gone a long way in enforcing this principle.
It was applied in a case where the plaintiff, the National Cash Register
Company of Dayton, Ohio, during the World War, had written a letter
to all of its agents wherein it was stated, among other things: "We
must beat them [The Central Powers] or the word Germany will be
a stench in the nose of civilization for the next thousand years." In
1929 the defendant, a German competitor, had translations made of
this circular for distribution among prospective buyers. Said the court,
in granting an injunction :33
"It is true that the letter libeling the German people in the vilest
manner was used by plaintiff itself as an unfair competitive means
in the year 1918 . .. Its use by the plaintiff company as an unfair
competitive means does not give defendant the right to use it, long
after, in 1929 and 1930, as a competitive weapon against the plain-
tiff. Defendant's. conduct is just as unfair as it would have been
to disseminate information about a criminal act which had in fact
occurred many years before. The guilty party should not have his
misdeed thrown up to him for the rest of his life. . . . Competi-
tion should proceed upon the basis of the goods themselves. The
contest is not between the personalities of the competitors. In using
the plaintiff's publication, ten years after the war, defendant ex-
ceeded the limits of normal orderly competition. It is immaterial
that the information disseminated by defendant was true."
Another interesting application of the same principle may be found
in those German cases where the defendant was enjoined' from publishing
the terms of a judgment which he had obtained in an unfair competition
proceeding against the plaintiff. As a general rule such publication is
permissible, being essentially a defensive measure designed to enlighten
the public and to restore the competitive equilibrium which had been
disturbed in favor of the guilty party by his unfair practices. But pub-
32. Reichsgericht II. Z. S. of Feb. 24, 1933; Markenschutz und Wettbewerb
(MW) 33, 252.
33. Kammergericht xxxi. Z. S. of Nov. 9, 1931, MW 32, 253. See also Reichs-
gericht II. Z. S. June 14, 1932, MW 32, 455, where the defendant was enjoined from
informing customers that his rival had conspired with the enemies of the German people
to bring about the separation of the Rhineland from Germany. The court found that
the plaintiff's treasonable activities dated many years back. These German decisions
are particularly interesting since the Unfair Competition Statute contains an express
provision giving a remedy for false defamatory statements (§ 14). The courts might
easily have construed this section as indicating a legislative intent that no action should
lie for true defamatory statements.
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lication ceases to be defensive and assumes the characteristic elements of
an attack, if it appears at a time when the public, having forgotten the
plaintiff's unlawful practices, need no longer be enlightened. This con-
stitutes an attempt to exploit the decree for the defendant's own adver-
tising purposes and has, therefbre, been held to be enjoinable unfair
competition.
France, unlike Germany, has no special Unfair Competition Statute.
The law of unfair competition grew out of the general tort rule of the
French Civil Code of 1804. It is provided in article 1382 that lveryone
who wrongfully injures another person shall be liable for damages. Re-
lying on that article, the Tribunal Civil de la Seine, in the case of Jacquot
v. Berthoud held that defendant had "exceeded the limits of fair com-
petition" in calling the attention of the public, in 1872 and 1875 respec-
tively, to a civil judgment that had found plaintiff guilty of infringement
as far back as 1859.15 In Switzerland, as in France, the law of unfair
competition developed out of statuitory tort proyisions couched in very
general terms. The Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland has held that
disparagement of a rival might constitute unfair competition even though
the statements are true.3 6
If these decisions had been rendered under specific statutory provi-
sions giving a remedy for true defamatory statements, they could hardly
be expected to arouse the interest of American lawyers and judges. What
makes them significant is the fact that the German, French and Swiss
courts, in reaching their conclusions, had nothing to guide them but
broad statutory generalities. Since in this country, also, judges have to
fill the term "unfair competition" with meaning by establishing definite
standards, these foreign precedents would seem to be of assistance.
34. Oberlandesgericht Hamburg IV. Z. S. August 10, 1926, MNIV 26, 223 (publica-
tion of decree more than five years after issuance enjoined.) Accord: Reichsgericht
II. Z. S. March 31, 1925, MW 24, 206; Oberlandesgericht iel IL Z. S. March 25,
1913, MW 13, 328 (publication of decree more than one year after issuance enjoined);
cf. Reichsgericht II. Z. S. June 15, 1934, MW 34, 370.
35. Annales de la Propriit6, Industrielle, (Anntles) 1878, 331. True, the defendant
was chargeable with -a minor inaccuracy in summarizing the judgment of 1859. But a
dose reading of the decision would seem to warrant the conclusion that this was not the
ratio decidendi of the case.
36. Decision of November 23, 1895, reported in Gewerblicher Rechtschutz und
Urheberrecht (G. R. U.R.) 1897, 110 et seq. The Court, in a well reasoned opinion,
reached the conclusion that where a business man had made it a practice to refer to his
competitor's past the truth of the allegation could not be pleaded as a defense.
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II.
DEFAMATORY REFERENCES TO PRESENT UNLAWFUL OR UNETHICAL
BEHAVIOR OF THE RIVAL UNCONNECTED3 7 WITH THE
CONDUCT OF HIS BUSINESS
It remains for us to consider whether the rule should differ when the
defendant refers to present unlawful or unethical behavior of his rival
unconnected with the conduct of his rival's business. If a business man
has violated the criminal law and gone unpunished, or if he is still en-
gaged in criminal activities of one sort or another, the public interest
in .law enforcement demands that a competitor, no less than any other
citizen, be free to communicate to the prosecuting authorities any in-
formation he may possess about such unlawful acts. But public interest
does not demand that the competitor be free to lay the information before
his rival's customers. On the contrary, to do so would seem to be unfair
competition for the same reason that reference to the rival's past is
reprehensible. The unfairness lies "in depriving the rival of the reward
to which he may be entitled by virtue of his superior service." 38 Corn-
petition, even with a law breaker, should proceed on the basis of his goods
or services, and it is submitted that to enforce such a rule would be in
the interest not only of the competitor but of the buying public as well.
There is an additional reason why it may be regarded as unfair for a
competitor to advise cust6mers about his rival's unlawful acts. The
information, without being false, may be incomplete and therefore mis-
leading. At the time the attack is delivered the rival is not present to
defend himself and give his side of the story. Thus customers may
presume him guilty and withdraw their patronage before he has had
an opportunity to be heard.
Of course, this latter argument is less persuasive if the defendant does
not inform customers of his rival's wrongdoing until after the latter's
trial and conviction. Even then the danger of incomplete and one-sided
information is not entirely eliminated. The defendant may, for instance,
fail to paint a complete picture by omitting to mention that his rival
has been recommended for a pardon. But assuming that the defendant
gives customers an impartial account of all the material facts, the ques-
tion arises whether an injunction should not be granted on the strength
of the first reason alone. A recent German decision has answered this
question in the affirmative. Plaintiff, a machine manufacturer, had been
convicted and fined for violating the foreign exchange laws. The de-
fendant immediately had copies made of a newspaper account that ap-
37. On the question as to whether the defendant should be permitted to refer to
present unlawful or unethical behavior of his rival in connection with the conduct of
the rival's business, see infra, p. 1328.
38. See supra, p. 1307.
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peared on the day following the trial, and then instructed his salesmen
to read the story to prospective customers. The court held that the plain-
tiff's offense threw no light on the quality of his machines and took
what would seem to be the commendable position that it is not the
function of a competitor to spread the news of his rival's misconduct
among customers.39
The same considerations apply where a competitor believes that his
rival is guilty, not bf criminal or unlawful acts but of lack of patriotism,
disloyalty to the government or some unethical conduct. The -competi-
tor is at liberty to expose his rival's conduct to such agencies as are
competent and accustomed to investigate it. The Trade Association or
the Chamber of Commerce may be the proper organizations. He should
not be at liberty to refer to these matters in advertising circulars or in
personal conversation with customers.
While as a rule the merits of the goods or services rather than the
personalities of the rival tradesmen should turn the scales in favor of
one or the other of the contending parties, there are instances where the
seller's character may be of interest to the buyer. When a buyer con-
siders entering into a long-term contract for the delivery.of a commodity
or when he considers purchasing a machine on the seller's promise to
keep it in free repair for several years, the buyer's choice between two
rivals will of necessity be influenced by their reliability in performing
their contracts. Now it is conceivable that a seller's behavior, though
not directly connected with the conduct of his business, might permit
one to draw some inferences as to his reliability. And here it may be
argued that a competitor, in informing a prospective buyer, would do
him a real service and should be allowed to do so. This point came up
in a recent German case where the parties were competing for long-term
contracts and the defendant had told prospective customers that the
plaintiff was a political opportunist and, while formerly a Socialist, had
joined the Nazi party only for the sake of private gain. The court in-
timated that a trader might not be acting unlawfully in advising pros-
pective customers about his rival's unreliability but refused to apply
such a principle, 'if it existed, to the facts of this case. The court held
that the conduct imputed to the plaintiff did not cast reasonable doubt
on his trustworthiness in executing his contractual obligations and that
the defendant's statement referred to a matter which was of no real
concern to customers and outside the competitive struggle of the parties.
39. Reichsgericht II. Z. S. October 22, 1937, MW 38, 62. The same result has
been reached even where the story is read to a customer already familiar with the
plaintiff's offense through newspapers or other sources. By emphasizing the offense,
the defendant may well manage to stir the customer's sensibilities and persuade him
to cease business relations with the plaintiff. Reichsgericht IL 7. S. June 16, 1925,
V 25, 96.
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An injunction was granted on the ground of unfair competition irres-
pective of the truth of the defendant's statement.4 0 The court suggested
that the proper course for the defendant to follow would have been to
make representations to the public authorities rather than to the plain-
tiff's cugtomers.
III.
STATEMENTS ABOUT A COMPETITOR WHICH, THOUGH NOT
DEFAMATORY, MAY PREJUDICE CUSTOMERS AGAINST HIm
A business man may have certain personal characteristics or he may
hold certain views which, if exposed, might not affect his reputation' as
a man of character and honor and yet might prejudice the public or
certain sections of it against him. Should a competitor be permitted
to inform customers about the private life, the political or religious
beliefs or the racial origin of his rival? Can it be said to be fair com-
petition if in order to discredit his rival he tells customers that his rival
believes in the Fascist or Communist form of government, or that he
never goes to church, or that he is a colored man? All these matters
have no bearing upon the quality of that rival's goods or services or on
his social usefulness as a seller and should not, therefore, be dragged
into the competitive struggle. Again, the right of privacy affords an
analogy. It has been held to be an unlawful invasion of that right to
comment in public on a man's personal affairs even when no financial
loss was caused and when the injury inflicted was injury to personality
only.41 And the truth of the comment was held to be no defense. A
fortiori, should not the law give a remedy where such comment is also
intended and calculated to damage a man's business, that is where the
injury is to property rights?
In Germany it is well settled that a business man who, for advertising
purposes, refers to such personal characteristics or beliefs of a rival as
would be calculated to arouse the prejudice of customers and therefore
injure that rival's business, is guilty of unfair competition and can be
enjoined under Section 1 of the German statute. 2 How deeply this
principle is embedded in the law can best be illustrated by an interesting
recent application. In view of the well-known anti-Jewish policies of
the National Socialist Government there would have been no cause for
surprise if the courts generally had permitted business men to inform
40. Reichsgericht II. Z. S. January 25, 1935, MW 35, 151. Accord: Reichsgericht II.
Z. S. February 22, 1935, MW 35, 231. But cf. Reichsgericht II. Z. S. May 15, 1928, MW
27-28, 494.
41. Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S. W. 967 (1927); see also cases cited
supra, notes 22, 23.
42. See supra, p. 1309.
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customers of the Jewish origin of their competitors. It might easily
have been argued that to do so would further the aims of the National
Socialist State. Some lower courts, indeed, have taken tis view.43 Yet
the German Supreme Court, applying the general rule, has enjoined this
conduct on the ground of unfair competition.4
IV.
DISPARAGEMENT OF A COMPETITOR'S GooDs
In all the situations discussed up to this point the intention of the
aggressor was, of course, to divert business which would normally go
to his rival. This end was sought to be accomplished by indirection, that
is, by discrediting the person of the competitor in the eyes of customers
so as to make them blind to the merits of his goods or services. We shall
now consider those situations where the attack is directly aimed at the
competitor's business. Let us begin with the most common and most
effective attack, which consists in making derogatory references to the
character, quality, utility or value of another's goods. 40
Disparagement may assume various forms. The rival's goods may be
condemned in such general terms as "worthless" or "no good". Specific
defects of his articles may be mentioned and criticized. Or, without
doing either, a trader may simply assert that his goods are better than,
or superior to,46 the competitor's goods, either in general or in some par-
ticular respect. This latter type of attack, sometimes called "comparative
disparagement", will be discussed first.
In the leading English case of White v. Melli5 4 the parties were com-
peting manufacturers of Infant Food. The defendant advertised that
his preparation was far more nutritious and healthful than the plain-
tiff's.48 Action was brought for damages and an injunction. The alter-.
native, as the court saw it, was either to make the issue turn on the
43. See RUDLOFF-BLOCHWirrZ, DAS RECET DES WMEIVnEan s (1938) 228.
44. Reichsgericht II. Z. S. January 12, 1937, MW 37, 250. Accord: Reichsgericht
II. Z. S. February 25, 1936 G.R.U.R. 1936, 645. But cf. Reichsgericht II. Z. S. January
26, 1937, MW 37, 246, permitting the defendant to make representations to the public
authorities.
For an excellent discussion of the problems dealt with up to this point see CA.LmAm;,
DER Un.AuTE RE WNmV xva (1932) 175.
45. See Handler, supra note 1, at 197.
46. Or, what amounts to the same thing, that the competitor's goods are inferior
to his own. Cf. Smith, Disparagement of Property (1913) 13 CoL. L REv. 133.
47. [1895] A. C. 154.
48. The defendant did not mention the plaintiff by name; but in view of the par-
ticular circumstances of the case, a majority of the judges reached the conclusion that
he had aimed the attack at the plaintiff. They, therefore, treated the case as if the
plaintiff had been mentioned by name.
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truth or falsity of the statement, or to hold for the defendant irrespective
of the falsity of his statement. The first possibility was rejected on the
ground that if the courts were to ascertain the accuracy of such state-
ments they would be turned "into a machinery for advertising rival
productions by obtaining a judicial determination which of the two was
better." As a result of this decision no remedy lies in England even
though the defendant's statement is false and causes damage. It was
so held five years later in Hubbuck and Sons v. Wilkinson.
0
The English doctrine was recently approved in this country in National
Refining Company v. Benzo Gas Motor Fuel Coinpany.10 But the dis-
cussion of this point was mere dictum. Moreover, the court went no
further than to say that "no recovery can be had" under the facts of
the White and Hubbuck cases. 1 This leaves the question whether an
injunction might not issue on the ground of unfair competition. The
issue is an open one today and should be decided in the light of present
conditions and standards. The English doctrine is based on the premise
that it is for the customers rather than for the court to determine which
of two rival goods is the better. This is as sound an assumption today
as it was forty years ago. The defendant's goods may be better for one
purpose or for one group of people or at one time, and the plaintiff's
goods for another purpose or for another group of people or at another
time. To try the respective merits of several articles and weigh them
against each other seems beyond the province of a court.52 But if judges
are unwilling to determine which of two rival articles is the better, does
it follow that each trader should be permitted to assert that his own
article is superior to the other? Lord Herschell, in White v. Mellin,
made the interesting statement "That this sort of puffing advertisement
is in use, is notorious, . . . " and again on the same page: " . . .
advertisements and announcements of that description have been common
enough."5 3 We may assume, therefore, that the court in permitting
these advertisements merely recognized the then prevailing mores of the
trade. In the meantime the mores have changed. Business standards
are higher now than they were forty years ago. 4 Today the business
community perceives and acknowledges a distinction which, though subtle,
is nevertheless real; the distinction between mere puffing-that is, the
49. [1899] 1 Q. B. 86. The defendants had stated in a circular that their zinc was
better than plaintiff's.
50. 20 F. (2d) 763 (C. C.A. 8th, 1927).
51. Johnson v. Hitchcock, 15 Johns. 185 (N. Y. 1818), cited by the court, was
likewise an action for damages. See also Tobias v. Harland, 4 Wend, 537 (N. Y. 1830).
52. See White v. Mellin, [1895] A. C. 154, where the evidence tended to show that
the plaintiff's food was better suited for children under six months of age while defend-
ant's food was more desirable for children above that age.
53. [1895] A.C. 154, 165.
54. See DENNISON, ETHICS AND MODERN BUSINESS (1932) 1, 55.
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assertion that your product is the best or better than all others-and the
assertion that your product is better than that of a specifically designated
competitor. While the former type of advertisement is still in vogue,
the latter is generally regarded as unethical and no longer practiced by
self-respecting business men."
In business circles the feeling seems to be growing today that one
seller should not express an opinion about the goods of another, because
to do so would be to'act as judge in a matter -where interests of his own
are at stake. 6 Thus the courts' unwillingness and the competitor's un-
fitness to act as judge suggest that a solution be adopted which did not
and could not occur to the English judges, namely, to hold comparative
disparagement to be enjoinable unfair competition irrespective of the
accuracy of the opinion expressed. An exception may perhaps be made
when a customer has requested the comparison."
This solution has been adopted in France and Germany. Both French
and German courts have drawn a sharp distinction between mere puffing
and comparative disparagement. German decisions have permitted a
business man to assert that his goods are the best or better than all
other goods." But he must not state that they are better than those of
a specified competitor. It was so held in a recent case where the defend-
ant, a candle manufacturer, had stated in a circular that plaintiff's candles
were inferior to his own in that they did not burn as brightly nor for
so long a time. Said the court, in granting an injunction :9
"Every business man is entitled to praise his own goods. But a
comparison of one's goods with those of a specific competitor for
the purpose of recommending the former at the expense of the
allegedly inferior product is counter to the principles of honest com-
petition and it is immaterial whether the statements made are in
fact true . . . By maling such a comparison a business man as-
sumes to act as judge in his own cause. This exceeds the limits of
honest competition. Even if their article is inferior, competitors
cannot be made to serve as a standard of comparison for the goods
or services of another. The appraisal of the goods of competing
manufacturers selling at the same or different prices must be left
55. See infra, p. 13334. Cf. the Code of the American Optometric Association,
reprinted in HEEmAxcm, Conas oF ETHicS (1924) 399: "We agree to discontinue
advertising articles or supplies as 'better' or in any way superior in quality . . . to
that of other optometrists . . ."
56. See infra, p. 13334; SHARP AND Fox, op. cit. supra note 3, at 144-145. Cf. the
Code of the National Petroleum Marketers Ass'n where the expression of opinions of
a competitor's wares is specifically prohibited. Hu'. A CE, op. Cit. supra note 55, at 417.
57. Cf. infra, p. 1320.
58. Reichsgericht II. Z. S. Dec. 12, 1930, G.RU.R. 1931, 165 and Dec. 2, 1932, MW
33, 121.
59. Reichsgericht II. Z. S. Nov. 25, 1932, MW 33, 71.
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to the consumers. The public, when confronted with such a com-
parison either in an advertisement or in personal conversation is,
as a rule, not in a position to verify the accuracy of the statement.
Moreover, experience teaches that there exists no uniform standard
for the appraisal of the qualities of an article. What appeals to some
as excellent. will be regarded as poor by others. Therefore, each
consumer should be left to decide for himself which of two com-
peting articles is the better. A business man who, without neces-
sity, refers to his competitor's article and thereby influences the
judgment of the consumer. is guilty of unfair competition within
the meaning of Section 1 of the Unfair Competition Statute."00
The court makes the basic assumption that comparative disparagement
will influence the public and, as a result, injure the competitor. This is
particularly interesting since White v. Mellin has been defended on the
opposite assumption that "statements by a trader vaunting the superiority
of his goods are not likely to influence the conduct of possible customers,
and hence will very seldom work damage to a rival."0 1 This assumption
may have been justified at a time when no distinction was made between
"seller's talk" (puffing) and comparative disparagement and the one was
as common as the other. Today, however, since comparative disparage-
ment is no longer generally practiced, we may assume, as the German
Reichsgericht does, that the buying public has become more sensitive
to its use. While consumers, as a rule, may not rely on puffing, at least
some portions of them are likely to be influenced today by comparative
disparagement.
2
The French courts, without rationalizing as thoroughly as the German
Reichsgericht, have reached the same conclusion. In the case of Violet
v'. X the defendant, a producer of wine, had sold his bottles bearing
the following label: "The Thir [defendant's trademark] compares favor-
ably with Absinthe, Byrrh and Bitter." The owner of the mark Byrrh
brought an action for damages on the ground of unfair competition.
The court gave judgment for plaintiff, saying: "Defendant has not con-
fined himself to praising the quality of his wine. He has also asserted
that the wine Byrrh is inferior to his own and has thereby disparaged
that product." This was held to be unfair competition. The accuracy
of defendant's statement was not examined by the court. 3 In the case
of Bardou v. Sabatou" the defendant, a manufacturer of cigarette paper,
60. See supra, p. 1309.
61. Smith, Disparagement of Property (1913) 13 COL L. REv. 121, 134.
62. For a criticism of the English doctrine see "Slander of Goods" in England
and Germany (1934) 78 SoL.. J. 607.
63. Cour de Nancy, 1911, Annales, 1911, 1, 227. The decision went for plaintiff on
the ground of Art. 1382 of the Civil Code. See supra, p. 1311.
64. Cour de Paris, Annales, 1869, 115.
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stated on his labels that his product was far superior to that of his rival.
The court granted an injunction on the ground of unfair competition,
again without inquiring into the correctness of the assertion."
We now come to a kind of attack where the defendant not only
asserts the relative inferiority of the plaintiff's product as compared to
the defendant's (comparative disparagement) but judges the plaintiff
by an absolute standard. The assertion here is that the plaintiff's products
are "no good", "worthless", "a laughing stock", "of a low grade", "of
a poor quality." It has been said that "such expressions are not uncom-
mon among rivals in trade and their correctness in each instance is for
determination of those whose custom is sought, and not of the courts."C
But that was in 1901. In the meantime trade mores have changed, here
no less than in the field of comparative disparagement, and so we need
not be surprised to find that statements of this sort have been enjoined
in recent years. In Stevens Ice Cream Company v. Polar Product Com-
pany, 7 a seller of ice cream was enjoined from stating that his rival's
product was "not of high grade." The decision rested on unfair com-
petition. In Menard v. Houle defendant was restrained from asserting
that the plaintiff's automobiles were "no good."6 8 In Bourfois, Incor-
porated v. Park Drug Company,0 9 the defendant would have been en-
joined from asserting that his rival's face powder was "of inferior
quality '" if plaintiff had succeeded in proving that the statement had
in fact been made.
In the three cases cited the untruthfulness of the charge seemed to
be regarded as an element of the wrong. If untruthfulness is to remain
a criterion, then it may be said that a sweeping condemnation of another's
wares always carries with it an element of untruthfulness. In the candle
65. How far the French courts will go in condemning comparative disparagement
is illustrated by a case where the defendant stated truthfully in advertisements that the
Academy of Medicine had examined his and the plaintiff's pharmaceutical products and
had found his to be far superior to plaintiff's. The court held this to be unfair competition.
The decision rendered in 1851 [Raquin v. Mothes Cour de Paris, D.P. 1851, 2, 168]
is one of the earliest judicial pronouncements on the French law of unfair competition
and illustrates that the French never limited its meaning to passing-off but started out
with a very broad concept, embracing other reprehensible practices as well.
For a collection of the French authorities see AtExAxDRoFl', CoNcunmz=c DLoy'x.
(1935) No. 606.
66. Dallas, J., in Nonpareil Cork Mfg. Co. v. Keasbey & Mattison Co., 103 Fed.
721 (C. C. B. D. Pa. 1901).
67. 194 N. Y. Supp. 44 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
68. 11 N. E. (2d) 436 (Mass. 1937). The defendant was a non-competitor but
the court intimated that the result would have been the same had he been a competitor.
For a discussion of this case see Comment (1938) 72 U. S. L REv. 7. Cf. mipra, note 10:
Saxon Motor Sales Inc. v. Torino, 2 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 885 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
69. 82 F. (2d) 468 (C. C.A. 8th, 1936).
70. The phrase was apparently used not in a comparative but in an absolute sense.
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case the German Supreme Court pointed out 71 that in the absence of
definite standards each individual customer should be left to determine
for himself which one of two competing articles is the better. The same
reasoning applies here. An article may be worthless to one customer
and be worth a great deal to another. It may seem of poor quality to
some and of excellent quality to others. Therefore, it is both unfair
toward the competitor and prejudicial to the best interests of the buying
public indiscriminately to prejudice all customers against a product which
may be of utility at least to some. This is the attitude the German courts
have taken. In a recent case a manufacturer of certain medicinal prepar-
ations was enjoined from asserting that to use his rival's preparation
was "a waste of time."'7 2 In another recent case a manufacturer of socks
was enjoined from implying that his competitor's product was "no
good."73 In both cases defendant's conduct was characterized as unfair
competition. In neither case did the court examine the accuracy of the
statement. The same result has been arrived at in France. 74
Nor should it matter whether the criticism is expressed in general
terms or is particularized. For instance, it should make no difference
whether the defendant charges that the plaintiff's linotype machines are
"no good" or whether the assertion is that they are difficult to operate
and wasteful of lead, that they frequently get out of order and that the
type is often unclear."5 None of these four statements is susceptible of
proof. Such terms as "difficult", "wasteful", "frequently", and "often"
have no definite meaning. They will mean one thing to one person and
a different thing to another. All of the four statements are therefore
ambiguous and likely to mislead and should be enjoined for that reason.
As a general rule it should be regarded as unfair competition for a trader
to express an unfavorable opinion about his rival's goods.
The situation changes somewhat if the trader has been asked by a
customer to give an opinion about his rival's goods. The trader cannot
be expected to decline. But he should be careful not to do his rival an
injustice. There is no reason to permit a competitor, even when his
opinion is asked, to indulge in a sweeping condemnation of his rival's
goods. This point came up in the German case already mentioned where
a seller of medicinal preparations was restrained from stating that to
use his rival's product was a waste of time. An injunction was granted
71. See supra, p. 1318.
72. Reichsgericht II. Z. S. Nov. 3, 1936, MW 37, 133.
73. Reichsgericht II. Z. S. Feb. 23, 1937, MW 37, 292.
74. In the case of Turbin v. Borelli (Cour d'Aix 1870, Annales, 1873, 205) defendant
had stated that his rival's goods were "of very inferior quality". The court awarded
damages on the ground of unfair competition without examining the accuracy of the
statement.
75. This illustration is borrowed from HANDLER, op. cit. supra note 25, at 883.
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although the defendant made the utterance in response to a written in-
quiry. The court held he should have stated why he thought it was a
waste of time. The general rule was laid down that a competitor who
expresses an opinion about his rival's goods should do it in such a way
as to permit others to substantiate the opinion." This principle would
seem to be in conformity with the present standards of many American
business men.
77
What should be the rule if the statements made relate to matters of
fact which are susceptible of proof ?1 Here the question will immediately
be asked: Would not the interest of the public in learning as much as
possible about a seller's goods justify a competitor in telling the public
the truth about those goods? If we assume this proposition to be sound,
great caution is called for in applying it. Suppose a manufacturer of
a dentifrice truthfully states in a circular that his rival's product contains
soap while his own does not. The average reader would infer that soap
in a dentifrice is injurious or at least undesirable, whereas it really is
nQt.79 As a result, customers are misled and in gaining more informa-
tion will nevertheless be acquiring a more erroneous notion of the rival's
product than they had before. Or let us say that a manufacturer of a
baking powder truthfully tells prospective customers that his rival's
product contains no corn starch. He thereby creates the impression that
corn starch is a preferable, if not necessary, ingredient in a good brand
of baking powder, while in fact it is not.80 The principle underlying
76. Reichsgericht II. Z. S. of Nov. 3, 1936, MW 37, 133 at 137. Cf. also Reichs-
gericht II. Z. S. Sept. 25, 1936, MW 37, 67.
77. "A Realtor should never publicly criticize a competitor; he should never e.spress
an opinion of a competitor's transaction unless requested to do so . . . and his opinion
then should be rendered in accordance with strict professional courtesy and integrity."
Code of the National Association of Real Estate Boards, reprinted in HEnn, %NcE,
op. cit. supra note 57, at 452. "An engineer is never warranted in interposing between
particular clients and another engineer when unsolicited. When an opinion is asl:ed,
the situation changes somewhat, but even then the burden is on the engineer called upin
for an opinion to avoid any possibility of doing a brother engineer an injustice." Code
of American Association of Engineers, reprinted in TAEUSCu, PoucY AND ETHIcs 11;
Busrz~ss (1931) 445. See also infra, p. 1333.
78. As to the distinction between matters of fact and matters of opinion, see
Comment (1937) 16 TEx. L. REv. 90. Cf. SrznP AN Fox, op. cit. supra note 3, at
145.
79. LEE, BusiNuass ETHics (1926) 87.
80. An additional illustration would be a case where the defendant advises prospec-
tive buyers that one customer recently returned a machine bought from the defendant's
rival. Such a statement creates the impression that the machine was defective whereas
the customer may have abused it or not have known how to handle it. The German
Supreme Court has granted an injunction in just such a case where the defendant failed
to state why the machine had been sent back. Reicisgericht II. Z. S. October 11, 1932,
MfW 33, 10. Cf. the Code of the Electric Power Club: "It is often difficult to distinguish
between failures of apparatus by reason of defects in workmanship or design and those
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these illustrations is this: When a seller tells customers that his rival's
product has or has not a certain ingredient or quality and the effect of
the statement would be to mislead customers as to the significance of
the ingredient or quality, the practice should be prohibited as unfair
competition.
But even where the presence or lack of a certain ingredient or quality
is of real significance to the public in appraising a seller's product, still
the net effect of a rival's statement may be misleading. In pointing out
the weakness of the other's product he is more than likely to ignore its
strength. Self-interest will prompt a seller to emphasize the faults rather
than the virtues of his rival's goods. So we may safely assume that as
a rule a seller, pretending to tell the truth, will not tell the whole truth,
A cigarette manufacturer, for instance, may be accurate in telling cus-
tomers that his cigarettes contain less nicotine than the products of a
specified rival. Yet the same manufacturer will fail to mention that other
ingredients of tobacco smoke-ammonia gas, pyridine and carbon mon-
oxide-are more injurious than nicotine a' and that his rival's cigarettes
contain less of these. Now it may be suggested that even a seller who
points out only the defects of his rival's article is performing a useful
public function; that once the defects have been brought to light it should
be incumbent upon the rival to impress the public with compensating
virtues. Those who so reason overlook the conditions under which modem
competition is carried on. Were both parties to appear simultaneously
in the market place and were the defendant then to reveal the defects
of the plaintiff's goods, it could perhaps be argued that no harm would
be done since the plaintiff could immediately supplement the defendant's
statements with information of his own. Under present competitive con-
ditions, however, rivals seldom present themselves to the public at the
same time or at the same place. The defendant's attack is delivered either
in personal conversation with individual customers or in circulars and
letters. The one-sided picture the defendant paints of the plaintiff's
article may influence the customers' minds and cause them to place their
orders with the defendant before the plaintiff has had an opportunity
to defend his goods. The plaintiff in many instances will lose customers
before he even knows that the attack has been delivered or to whom the
statements have been made. To permit this to happen would not seem
to be in the best interest of the public and is manifestly unfair to the
plaintiff.
82
due to other causes; for example, abuse or misapplication on the part of the customer.
Therefore, it is not ethical to draw the attention of a purchaser to the supposed failure
of a competitor's line or type of product even though occasional instances of such
apparent failure may have been reported." LEE, op. cit. supra note 79, at 273.
81. TAEUSCH, op. cit. supra note 77, at 451.
82. Half truths about a rival's article are perhaps less injurious if the parties
compete for the trade of expert buyers such as users of expensive machines or dealers.
[Vol. 47: 13041322
UNFAIR COMPETITION
It is largely for these reasons that German and French courts have
taken what would seem to be the commendable position that disparage-
ment of a rival's product constitutes actionable unfair competition even
if the statements made are true. Thus the German Supreme Court
enjoined a trader from stating in a circular that his baking powder con-
tained a higher percentage of an allegedly healthful ingredient than that
of his rival.8 3 The accuracy of this assertion was held to be immaterial.
Similarly, the Appellate Court of Paris recently held that a cause of
action for unfair competition was shown where the defendant had added
to his catalogue an apparently accurate description of the plaintiff's pro-
duct."4 And it should not matter if such description purports to be the
result of scientific analysis.
The rule here advocated is subject to important qualifications. The
plaintiff need not show, of course, that his name was mentioned by the
defendant. It is sufficient that those whom defendant addressed were
supposed to, and did, understand that the plaintiff's product was aimed
at.85 But to be actionable the attack must always be directed against an
individual rival. A different situation is presented if the attack is directed
against a product generally as distinguished from the product of one
individual manufacturer. Suppose in an advertisement the reader is
urged to put in an automatic oil-burning furnace to avoid the dirt and
work that go with coal-burning types. s0  Here the advertiser did not
disparage the product of an individual seller of coal-burning furnaces as
being of inferior make. What he did was to disparage the type, the
product as such. And the same is true if a manufacturer of coal-burning
furnaces should urge his customers to remain loyal to this type because
automatic furnaces explode or fail at critical moments. Here no private
remedy would lie, because the attack is not individualized. A nice
question may arise if the product criticized was manufactured by only
one firm. The case came up in Germany when a seller of coffee published
this advertising slogan: "Coffee without caffeine is like an automobile
These are more discriminating and less likely to form a hasty judgment than the general
public. Yet it would seem that the difference is in degree rather than in principle.
83. Reichsgericht II. Z. S. of October 6, 1931, 1iSW 31, 626. Accord: Reichs-
gericht II. Z. S. May 4, 1934, MW 34, 284. Cf. Reichsgericht II. May 9, 1936, G.R.U.R.
1937, 230, where defendant was enjoined from telling customers that plaintiff's stove
consumed twice as much gas as the defendant's. Cf. also case cited smpra note 80.
84. Isolfeu v. Wanner Cour d'Appel, Paris, 1934, Annales, 1934, 227. For a dis-
cussion see A.EXANDROFF, CONCURRENcE DiLOYALE (1935) No. 616-618, vhere many
other authorities are cited.
85. This is the rule applicable in actions for defamation and disparagement. See
National Refining Co. v. Benzo Gas Motor Fuel Co., 20 F. (2d) 763 (C. C.A. 8th,
1927), 55 A. L. R. 423 (1928). The same rule should apply in an action for unfair
competition.
86. See TAEUSCH, op. dit. stpra note 77, at 468.
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without gasoline." The Kaffee-Hag Co. was at the time the only manu-
facture of de-caffeinized coffee. Its suit for unfair competition was dis-
missed." Where the attack is directed against the entire genus rather
than a species, it should not matter how many sellers of the genus are
in the field. The public interest in progress demands that sellers be given
a full measure of freedom in discussing the relative merits or demerits
of two different types of product. While it may not always be easy to
draw the line between an attack on a genus and an attack on a species,
the distinction seems sound in principle, and is being observed by the
courts in Germany and France."
Exceptional cases may arise when it would not be reprehensible to
refer to the product of a specific competitor by mentioning his name or
brand. A trader may be unable adequately to explain to customers a
mechanical improvement of his article over those in the field except by
comparing his article with that of a specific competitor. But as a rule
the legitimate purpose of effective advertising can be achieved by com-
parison with previously known types or systems, and if it can, fairness
demands that an individual competitor should riot be singled out for
attack. On the other hand a trader should be privileged to furnish in-
formation about his rival's product if a customer so requests. He should
perhaps be at liberty-although this is debatable-to defend himself
against an attack on his own product by giving the public information
about his rival's product, provided that such information is calculated
and necessary to repel the attack. If A has pointed out to customers a
certain weakness in B's machine, thereby creating the impression that
A's machine is superior, an action should lie against A under the princi-
ples discussed above. But B may feel that successful litigation could
not fully repair the harm done to his prestige and so he may prefer
himself to correct the erroneous impression by calling the attention of
customers to a weakness in A's machine, if there is one, which might
counterbalance the weakness in his own. It would not seem unreasonable
87. Reichsgericht II. Z.S. March 23, 1928, MW 27-28, 347. For a discussion of
the question of whether the Federal Trade Commission has power under § 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act to issue a cease and desist order against a trader who disseminates
falsehoods about a type of product, see NoRwooD, TRADE PRAcrICE AND PRucs LAW
(1938) 64.
88. For the French law see Chambre syndicale des fabricants de papiers peints v.
Etablissement Georget, Cour de Paris, 1933, Annales, 1934, 5, where the defendant's
statement that wall paper was unhealthful was held non-actionable on the ground that
that statement did not constitute an attack on the product of a specific manufacturer.
Accord: Chambre syndicale des Bruleurs de cafM v. Soc. Sanka, Cour de Paris, 1935,
Annales, 1936, 32, where the Sanka Co. had asserted that coffee was injurious to the heart.
For the German law, see Reichsgericht II. Z. S. October 5, 1934, MW 34, 461, where it
was held non-actionable to assert that the ordinary wood lead pencil was wasteful. De-
fendant manufactured a different type of pencil. Cf. Reichsgericht II. Z. S. January 26,
1938, Juristische Wochenschrift 1938, 884.
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for B to do this. He should not go further, however, and state, for
instance, that A's machines are "no good". Such a statement is no
longer defensive but itself constitutes an attack unduly disparaging A's
machines. Moreover, B's right to disparage A's product in self-defense
should be dependent on an attack against B's own product. No such
right arises if A has inflicted upon B a wrong of a different kind. If
A, for instance, has infringed B's trade-mark B should seek redress in
the courts. Derogatory references to the quality of A's goods are neither
calculated nor necessary to repair the damage B may have suffered as a
result of passing-off.
The exceptions discussed here are recognized in Germany."0 Perhaps
experience will show that additional exceptions have to be made. The
Code of the Electric Power Club has expressed the view that "It is
proper to make comparison of one's own product with that of a com-
petitor when such comparison is based on . . . data which can be
readily verified by the prospective purchaser, such for example as weights
and dimensions."" While the position taken in this Code has found
some approval91 it should not be forgotten that certain data may be
capable of being verified by the buying public and yet be incomplete,
one-sided, and therefore misleading. And, as we saw above, this is
likely to be so. The preferable rule, therefore, would seem to be that
any seller who furnishes factual information about the product of a
specified rival should bear the burden of proving, in an action for unfair
competition brought against him, that legitimate interests of his own
other than just the desire to gain a competitive advantage comnpelled him
to speak about that rival's product. The wish to protect customers from
injury should not be regarded as a compelling reason. If a competitor
believes that his rival's products contain poisonous ingredients or other-
wise threaten the lives, health, or safety of the public, he should com-
municate with the health authorities or such agencies as are competent
and accustomed to investigate charges of this nature and to take the
necessary steps for the protection of the public. Self-respecting business
men regard this as the proper course to pursue. Thus, the Code of the
Association of Electragists provides that it is the duty of every member
to "bring to the attention of the proper authorities the existence of
electrical conditions which are unsafe to life and property,""2 [Italics
added] and in the Code of the International Association of Milk Dealers
89. Reichsgericht II. Z. S. Nov. 26, 1937, MW 38, 93 at 99; October 11, 1932,
MW 33, 10; Nov. 3, 1936, 2W 37, 133; Dec. 2, 1932, MW 33, 121. For a penetrating
discussion and collection of further authorities see CALLIANN, DER UN.LAuT=l WVrr-
DmEwE- (1932) 179 et seq.; Wassermann, in LA PROPRtLIT- INDUsTUMLE (193S) 1S.
See also RuDLoFF-BLoCHWrrZ, DAs RECHT DES WMVmnEwMns (1938) 256.
90. Reprinted in SAU, AND Fox, op. cit. supra note 3, at 145.
91. See note 90, supra.
92. HIamAmxc, op. cit. supra note 55, at 157.
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the members are urged to report unsatisfactory conditions in a com-
petitor's business to the Secretary of the Association.3 It seems prefer-
able, indeed, to let a disinterested public agency rather than a competitor
be the judge of whether the products of any given trader are fit to be
offered for sale.
The present trend of business policy is to sell goods on their own
merits rather than on the demerits of others. To forbid traders, as a
general principle, to refer to a rival's product will do much to encourage
business men in this policy. Nor will ,the public suffer. Consumers'
organizations such as have recently been created are better qualified than
the competitor to furnish reliable information about the various products
in the market. 4
If the courts should not accept this rule and should persist in imposing
upon the plaintiff the burden of proving the falsity of the statement,
then the term "falsity" should be construed in the broadest sense possi-
ble. It should be enough for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's
utterance, though literally true, was in fact misleading or failed to do
complete justice to the plaintiff's product. No burden should be on the
plaintiff to show that defendant had deliberately or maliciously tried to
mislead customers. In an action for disparagement such a requirement
may exist." Where the action is for an injunction on the ground of
unfair competition, the state of mind of the defendant has been held
to be immaterial.9" Whoever takes it upon himself to enlighten the
public about a rival's goods acts at his own risk.
Neither should it matter whether the criticism of the goods has also
reflected upon plaintiff's reputation. This troublesome issue often arises
in an action for disparagement of goods because special damages must
be proved, while no such requirement exists in case of defamation of
character.97 The distinction between disparagement and defamation would
seem of no significance if the equitable relief of injunction is sought on
the ground of unfair competition. Actions for damages which have been
dismissed for want of special damage are no authority for the proposi-
tion that on similar facts an injunction should not be granted on the
ground of unfair competition. Here relief should be-and apparently
has been 9S--given irrespective of proof of special damages. This is in
line with the generally accepted ground for injunctive relief. Its fune-
93. SHARP AND FOX, op. cit. supra note 3, at 146.
94. For the literature on the consumer movement see OPPENHEIM, CASES ON TRADE
REG ULATION (1936) 437. Cf. SHARP AND Fox, op. cit. supra note 3, at 260 (one of the
functions of the Better Business Bureaus is to issue warnings to the public against
dangerous or fake drug products).
95. Handler, supra note 1, at 197.
96. DERENBERG, op. cit. stipra note 10, at 738 ci seq.
97. Handler, supra note 1, at 197.
98. See cases supra, p. 1319.
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tion is prevention of future injury rather than redress of damage in-
flicted in the past.
The question may be raised-and it is pertinent to all three forms of
disparagement here discussed 99--whether a more lenient attitude should
not be adopted when the derogatory reference to a competitor's product
is made in personal conversation with customers rather than in written
advertisements. There seems little basis for distinguishing the two situa-
tions in principle. If, in order effectively to advertise an article in news-
papers or circular letters, it is unnecessary to criticize a rivals article,
the same should be true of personal conversation. The ethics of sales-
manship on the road should not differ from the ethics of salesmanship
in print.' ° But there is the difficulty of proof. The only practicable way
of establishing oral disparagement is to have customers testify in court.
And customers, even if they remember what was said, will be reluctant
to appear as witnesses. They have nothing to gain by antagonizing one
of their suppliers for the benefit of the other.101 It is not surprising,
therefore, to find that virtually all the German litigation in this field has
arisen out of written disparagement.
V.
REFERENCES TO A COMPETITOR'S BUSINESS OR BUSINESS CONDUCT
A man's business has many aspects to which a competitor may be
tempted to refer. To consider them all would be beyond the scope of
this article. Nor is it necessary to do so. The guiding principles should
not be different here from what they are when defendant disparages the
plaintiff's goods. There would seem to be no reason to permit expres-
sions of opinion. As regards statements of fact, they will, as a rule, be
one-sided and misleading even though literally true. To speak about a
rival's business or business policies is justifiable only if legitimate inter-
ests cannot be adequately protected by other means. Discussion of a few
typical situations will serve to illustrate these principles.
A competitor sometimes criticises the price policy of his rival by
stating that the rival's prices are "too high". But in determining the
reasonableness of a price, cost must be considered. Cost, in turn, is
determined by a variety of elements such as raw materials, wages, rent,
interest on borrowed capital. A competitor cannot possibly have an in-
timate knowledge of all these factors. For him, without such knowledge,
99. See supra, p. 1315.
100. LEE, op. dt. supra note 79, at 89.
101. Wassermann, in LA PR oPRnxr INDUSTREME (1938) 15, on last p3ge.
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to judge and to prejudice customers against his rival's prices should be
regarded as unfair competition. It has been so held in France.
10 2
It should also be regarded as unfair competition to compare one's
lower prices with the higher prices of a specified competitor. 10 3 Even
if no direct criticism is made, the practice will, in many instances, be
equivalent to an :indirect criticism of the rival's prices. French courts
have taken this position1 °4 Furthermore, price comparison is frequently
misleading. It is likely to create the impression that the goods offered
by the two parties are of the same quality, while in fact only the use
of inferior ingredients or inferior workmanship may have allowed the
defendant to quote the lower price. For this reason the German Supreme
Court has held that as a general rule the comparison of prices no less
than of the goods themselves constitutes actionable unfair competition."'
The buyers, rather than the competitors, should make comparisons.
A more difficult question arises when we come to a seller's business
conduct which is socially undesirable or is so regarded by substantial
sections of the public. False advertising is probably the most conspicuous
example of the first category.
When a seller ascribes to his own product qualities which it does not
possess or when he makes other inaccurate statements about his product,
buyers will be deceived. Does it follow that a competitor should be
privileged, or even be encouraged, to call the attention of the public to
his rival's misleading statements? Perhaps we should answer the ques-
tion in the affirmative if there were no other way in which the public
could be protected. But means have been devised to stop the practice
of false advertising. The Federal Trade Commission may issue orders
102. See F~dration Nationale des Journaux Francais v. Coty, Cour d'Appel, Paris,
1930, Gaz. Pal. 1930, 1.930. Cf. the Code of the American Basket & Fruit Package
Mfrs. Association, where comment on competitors' prices is stated to be unethical.
HEERMANCE, op. cit. supra note 55, at 53; the Code of Ethics of the United Typothetae
of America ("It is not safe to criticize any price until one is in possession of all the
facts. The work itself does not say whether it was done by night or by day.") HInER-
MANCE, op. cit. mtpra note 55, at 440.
103. For unfair price advertising directed against all competitors indiscriminately
see KENNER, THE FIGHT FOR TRUTH IN ADVERTISING (1936) 201 et seq.
104. Hesse v. Grellety, Cour d'Appel, Bordeaux, 1859, DalU. Prr. 1859, 2, 170. Defend-
ant truthfully advertised that he was selling, at a lower price, goods of the same quality
as those offered by plaintiff. The court held this to be unfair competition on the ground
that the announcement implied that plaintiff charged excessive prices. Accord: Annales,
1913, 2, 33 and Annales, 1936, 367. Note the refinement of the doctrine of unfair com-
petition at such an early date. Cf. note 65, supra.
105. Reichsgericht II. Z. S. of March 11, 1927, MW 26, 340 =R.G.Z. 116, 277:
and of Nov. 26, 1937, MW 38, 98. Cf. Reichsgericht II. Z. S. of Feb. 13, 1934, MW
34, 202. It is unnecessary for the plaintiff to show that the defendant's products are,
in fact, of a lower quality.
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to cease and desist;"° the state may prosecute for violation of the model
false advertising statute ;107 business men themselves have established or-
ganizations, such as Better Business Bureaus, to deal with the problem."' 3
If a competitor wishes to protect the public from his rival's false adver-
tising, he should set in motion the machinery provided by these agencies.
They are all impartial bodies. They do not proceed without investigation
and hearing. It is unfair for a competitor to go before customers and
accuse a rival of false advertising without giving him an opportunity.to
be heard. It is of questionable value to buyers who, when confronted
with two conflicting statements, will not know which one to believe and
are likely to lose confidence in the honesty and reliability of all advertisers
of the product as well as in the advertised product itself."," The con-
clusion, therefore, seems warranted that from the point of view of
the buying public it is not necessary, nor is it desirable, that competitors
should be permitted to refer to the advertising matter of a rival.
But we must still consider another aspect of false advertising, namely
the harm it does to competitors. When a seller makes inaccurate state-
ments about his product he not only deceives the public but also, as a
result of such deception, he is likely to capture part of the trade which
might otherwise have gone to one or several of his more honest com-
petitors. The question therefore may be asked whether competitors should
not be permitted, for the sake of protecting their own interests, to advise
customers of their rival's objectionable conduct. In attempting to answer
this question we should not forget that false advertising, while harmful
to competitors in general, does not constitute an attack on any one com-
petitor.1 ' The seller speaks falsely about his own goods, not about those
of a specific competitor. We are, therefore, not confronted with a situa-
tion where a competitor, in calling his rival's conduct to the attention of
customers, could rely on self-defense as a justification. To denounce
the rival would be an attack on him rather than an act of self-defense
and should be regarded as actionable unfair competition.
Perhaps we should not be too much concerned about an attack made
on a rival who has been guilty of deliberate misrepresentation of
106. See Handler, supra note 1, at 195; OPPENnriHE, CASES O.- TRADE REGL.ATIO.N
(1936) 457 et seq.
107. HANDLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADE REGULATION (1937) 757.
108. Id. at 762 et seq. See KENNER, op. cit. mipra note 103.
109. "Disparagement of competitors is injurious not only to good will among adver-
tisers but also to public confidence in advertising." Code of Standards of Advertising
Practice adopted by the International Chamber of Commerce at its congress in Berlin,
June, July, 1937, Rule 111(2).
110. However, a false claim by a seller that only his goods have certain specified
characteristics is tantamount to the assertion that the competitors' products do not have
the same characteristics, and, in that sense, may constitute an attack on each competitor
individually.
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material facts. Injunctive relief will probably be denied him on the
basis of the "clean hands" doctrine."' But our sympathy should be with
the innocent delinquent who may be unaware of the misleading implica-
tions of his advertisement and may honestly believe that what he says is
the truth. Or he may be convinced that he has kept within the bounds of
permissible "sell&r's puff". He may be willing to modify the language
of his advertisement as soon as the facts are pointed out to him. Such
a man should not be held up to customers as cheating the public.
It may be insisted that a competitor should at least be at liberty, with-
out casting a reflection on his rival's character, to inform customers
truthfully that the rival's advertisement contains an inaccurate statement.
But the unsophisticated mind of the average purchaser will fail to per-
ceive the distinction between a deliberate lie and an objectively inaccurate
statement. A seller merely accused of the latter will stand convicted of
the former.
The proper course for a competitor to pursue is to seek redress through
the agencies mentioned above. 1 2 After a rival has been found guilty
by one of these agencies the competitor should be at liberty to inform.
customers of the finding, verdict or order. This seems justified in that
it tends to restore the competitive equilibrium which had been disturbed
in favor of the rival."
There remain to be discussed certain business policies which, though
by no means unethical, are regarded as undesirable by substantial sections
of the public. Many people, for political, social or religious reasons,
may not wish to buy foreign-made products or products containing
foreign raw materials; others, being in sympathy with the labor union
movement, may not want to purchase from a man who employs non-
union workers. Are these sentiments sufficient reason to permit a com-
petitor, if unsolicited, to inform customers that his rival carries foreign
made goods" 4 or employs non-union men? The chief objection to such
a course is the danger that the competitor will not tell the whole truth
and, as a result, will create a wrong impression. The rival may have
111. DERENBERG, Op. cit. supra note 10, at 659, et seq.
112. Only in exceptional cases will the courts grant relief in an action against the
rival. The theory still prevails that false advertising is not a tort on competitors. See
Handler, supra note 1, at 193-194.
113. See supra, p. 1310.
114. A different situation is presented when a competitor truthfully points out that
a specific product offered for sale by his rival is of foreign make or that the rival firm
is under foreign control. The question as to whether a competitor should be permitted
to do so has given rise to much litigation and debate in Germany. The German courts
have wavered in their attitude. Their tendency seems to have been to permit the practice
in times of war and high nationalistic passion and to prohibit it in ordinary times of
peace. For a discussion and collection of authorities, see CALLMANN, op. Cit. supra
note 89, at 177; BAUMBACH, DAS WMErnWaasasarz (3d ed. 1936) 98.
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made an honest attempt to reach an agreement with the union but may
have failed through no fault of his own. He may have but a few foreign
products left in stock and may have decided to abandon the foreign line
entirely. Furthermore there are always a great number of buyers to
whom the business policies here discussed are a matter of no concern,
buyers who are primarily interested in good quality and low price. A
competitor should not divert their attention from the main issue by repre-
senting his rival, if only by implication, as an anti-social or selfish
individual. In making references which are intended to be uncompli-
mentary a competitor is likely to create a hostile atmosphere against his
rival even among the disinterested and indifferent.
It would seem that a competitor is ill-qualified, nor is he needed, to
furnish impartial information about another seller's business policies.
Just as consumers' organizations have been established to give the public
factual data on marketed products,115 similar agencies will be created,
if sufficient interest exists, to answer buyers' inquiries about the business
and business policies of sellers.
A further problem is presented when a firm is in financial difficulties.
It may be reasoned that a competitor, in warning suppliers and cus-
tomers, protects them from possible loss, and therefore performs a real
service. On the other hand, we should not forget that the very warnings
issued by a competitor may cause the collapse of a firm which would
otherwise have survived. Suppliers may withhold deliveries. Banks may
withdraw credit. Customers may cancel orders. Would it not be most
improper for a competitor to contribute by his warnings to a contingency
against which he is warning? And should it make any difference whether
the information he divulges is accurate or not?"o
Only in exceptional instances will a competitor know as a fact that
his rival is unwilling or unable to perform his contracts. If in such a
case a customer or a supplier is threatened with certain injury the com-
petitor would seem to be privileged to speak."'
CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion is not designed as an exhaustive treatment
of all situations which may arise. It is merely an attempt to indicate
115. See supra, p. 1326.
116. In Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 29 F. (2d) 49 (C. C.A.
6th, 1928), it was held not to be an unfair method of competition under § 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act to inform customers that a bankruptcy petition had beCn
filed against a competitor. Said the court " . . . We know of no standard of practice
which forbids the telling of the truth even about a competitor." It is submitted that
such a standard in fact exists. See infra. p. 1333.
117. For an interesting illustration of such a case see SuAri AND Fox, op. cit. supr,
note 3, at 146.
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broadly the course which the writer feels should be followed if competi-
tion is to be established on a really fair basis. The conclusions arrived
at may be summarized as follows:
A suit in equity for an injunction on the ground of unfair competition
differs essentially from the actions at law for defamation of character
and for disparagement of goods. Therefore, the conditions of liability
which obtain in these two actions are not controlling in an action for
unfair competition. In particular, the truth of the defendant's statement
should, as a rule, not be a defense to such an action.
It should be regarded as actionable unfair competition:
(1) to inform customers or prospective customers of, or comment on
(a) a rival's past unlawful or unethical behavior whether connected
with his business or not;
(b) a rival's present unlawful or unethical conduct, if such conduct
is not connected with his business and casts no reasonable doubt on his
reliability in performing contracts;
(c) a rival's private life, his personal views and peculiarities, or his
racial origin.
(2) (a) to express to customers or prospective customers an un-
solicited opinion about a rival's goods, business or business policies, or
an opinion which, if solicited, fails to state a reason;
(b) to give customers or prospective customers factual information
about a rival's goods, business or business policies, unless vital interests
of the informant, or of the public, cannot be protected by other means.
These principles should apply irrespective of whether the information
or opinion was given orally or in writing.
The rules here advocated might be challenged on the ground that they
are not in accord with the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech.
But under these rules freedom of speech is not denied to a competitor.
He is free to carry on scientific research and to publish its results even
if they should be detrimental to a rival's product. He is at liberty to
furnish information about his rival's unlawful conduct and comment
upon it to public authorities and quasi-public bodies, such as Trade Asso-
ciations and Chambers of Commerce. He is not prevented, if he feels
inclined to do so, from entertaining his private guests with stories relat-
ing to his rival's past. However, freedom of speech never has meant the
unrestricted right to say what one pleases at all times and under all cir-
cumstances. The State Constitutions themselves provide that the freedom
of speech must not be abused."' It would be an abuse for a competitor
118. See HALE AND BENSON, LAW OF THE PRESS (1933) 350, 352. Cf. Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233
(1936); CHAFE, F EDoom OF SPEEcHr (1920).
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-with the exceptions specified above-to mention those matters in the
course of competition, that is, for the purpose of persuading his cus-
tomers not to buy from his rival or of persuading his rival's customers
to buy from him.1 19
As regards the question of remedy there are still some courts which
deny equitable relief against defamation and disparagement on the ground
that the constitutional right of freedom of speech would thereby be
abridged. But we have seen already that the weight of authority to-day
does not hesitate to grant an injunction if the suit is brought for unfair
competition." ° Therefore, if the argument is sound that the acts here
discussed constitute unfair competition, injunctive relief should not be
difficult to obtain.
In discussing the concept of unfair competition a well-known student
of the field has recently said that :121 "The lav against the unfair trader
must be constantly reappraised, and the criteria for the appraisal must
be sought in business facts and understandings rather than in an abstract
process of refining legal definitions." It is submitted that most of the
conclusions here reached are in conformity with the present ethical stand-
ards of the business community. A study of the voluntary codes of
ethics which have been adopted in many branches of industry, within
the last twenty years, makes this overwhelmingly clear. A great majority
of the codes examined, while differing in minor details of phraseology,
forbid disparaging or derogatory references to competitors or to their
goods, business or business methods. The prohibition is not aimed at
false statements of fact only, but includes true statements and exp ressions
of opinion as well. Some of the codes specifically say so. Others are
so worded as to leave no room for a different interpretation.
1 o
119. Cf. Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co., 122 Ga. 190, 219, 50 S.E. OS
(1905), where the court held that the constitutional right of free speech did not protect
a person who published an author's picture "merely for advertising purposes, and from
mercenary motives." It is interesting to note that the German Constitution of 1919 also
contained a provision guaranteeing the freedom of speech. (Art. 118). Yet the German
courts did not regard the conclusions here reached as incompatible with such constitutional
guaranty.
120. See WALsH, EQurry (1930) 264 et seq.; Comment (1937) 16 Tcx. L REv. 111.
121. Isaacs, Book Review (1938) 51 HAav. L. RE%. 769.
122. Typical Code provisions are: "We pledge ourselves, to compete always with
fairness, securing patronage on merit and without derogatory reference to a competitor
or his goods." Biscuit and Cracker Manufacturing Association, Lsn, op. cit. supra note
79, at 233; "We do not make false or disparaging statements, either written or oral,
nor circulate harmful rumours respecting a competitor's product, selling price, business,
financial or personal standing." American Association of Wholesale Opticians, id. at
267; "If you can't say good, say nothing." Retail Jeweler's Association, 1I :casA E,
op. cit. mipra note 57, at 256; "Do not knock competitors or competitors' goods". Nat.
Ass'n of Farm Equipment Manufacturers, id. at 180. For similar provisions in numerous
other Codes see HEERANCE, 36, 75, S6, 96, 109, 119, 135, 145, 177, 199, 228, 242,
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If these code provisions did no more than to express an abstract ethical
principle, they would be of little concern to the lawyer. What lends
significance to them from the lawyer's point of view is the fact that
most of them have been translated into actual business practice. 123 This
is particularly true in the field of advertising proper-i.e., those media
of publicity which appeal to the general public as distinguished from
individual customers. Observation of bill boards, placards, posters and
newspaper advertisements Will show that derogatory references to a
specific competitor have virtually disappeared. 124  Advertising over the
radio conforms to the same standard. The members of the advertising
profession being relatively few, self-regulation has proved successful.
A somewhat different situation exists where the appeal is directed not
to the general public but to individual members of the public. This activ-
ity is outside the province of the advertising profession. Each seller
attends to it himself and, .due to the large number of sellers involved,
this field is less amenable to self-regulation by the industry. So we need
not be surprised to find that in letters, circulars and personal conversa-
tion, disparagement of a specific competitor still occurs. But available
information indicates that even here only a minority of sellers indulge
in this selling method. The majority of self-respecting business men,
conforming to ethical standards, refrain from it.
To them the law owes protection. It is no answer that they can defend
themselves by also resorting to disparagement. A self-respecting busi-
ness man will not voluntarily adopt, and should not be driven to adopt,
244, 249, 302, 311, 322, 364, 368, 373, 374, 395, 403, 411, 425, 431, 433, 459, 465, 473,
477, 512, 516; LEE, 234, 254, 265, 270, 275, 280, 284, 287, 291, 304. Cf. the advertising
principles of various organizations reprinted in KENNER, op. cit. supra note 103, at 273.
Although the Trade Practice Rule usually proposed by the Federal Trade Commission at
Trade Practice Conferences, unlike the voluntary Codes adopted without sponsorship by
the Commission, prohibits only false disparagement, it does not follow that the Commission
considers truthful disparagement or expression of criticism as fair competition. Informa-
tion furnished by the Commission indicates that the purpose in drafting the rule was to
have it conform to the interpretation so far given by the courts to the term unfair com-
petition. For a collection of the industries which have adopted the Commission's Trade
Practice Rule, see C. C. H. Trade Reg. Serv. 20,016 (1938).
123. LEE, op. cit. supra note 79, at 262. Cf. HEERMANCE, THE ETHICS OF BUSINESS
(1926) 40.
124. A rather unusual advertisement appeared in the New York Times, Dec. 17,
1937, p. 5. R. H. Macy & Co. compared therein one of their own brands of laxative
salt, selling at 69 cents a bottle, with another specific brand of laxative salt, price-
fixed by its manufacturer and selling at 97 cents. While the name of this manufacturer
was not mentioned the Macy Co. offered to sell his product to "all who want it." At the
same time the public was urged to buy Macy's product which was represented to be
as good as, if rtot better than, the other. Without implying an answer the writer wishes
to raise the question whether such an advertisement accords with the highest standards
of ethics. For a similar advertisement by R. H. Macy & Co. see New York Herald-
Tribune, Dec. 3, 1937, p. 10.
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a selling method which he regards as undignified, unfair, and repulsive.
A competitor should not, by pursuing an unethical practice, force his
rival to choose between its adoption and the loss of his trade." 5
Both the French and the German courts have recently approached the
problem from the point of view here suggested. In France a trader had
published an apparently accurate statement about his rival's product. The
Court of Appeal of Paris held this to be unfair competition because the
defendant's conduct was "not in accord with business custom" ' , ("con-
traire aux usages du commerce"). The German Reiclsgericht on similar
facts granted an injunction on the ground that the defendant's conduct
was "out of line with the business methods of reputable merchants"' -
("Widerspricht den Gepflogenheiten des anstindigen Kaufmanns"). This
reasoning applies with equal force in this country. If the law permitted
a competitor to disregard ordinary business practice, it would, in effect,
encourage the unscrupulous trader to gain a competitive advantage over
his more conscientious rival.
In the past when a man suffered damage from his competitor, the
issue has often been whether the infliction of injury was privileged by
virtue of his competitive position. The minds of judges and writers have
long been occupied with the question as to whether competition should
not constitute a justification for acts which are unlawful if done by a
non-competitor.n" Our discussion raises the converse question: namely,
whether competition in certain instances should not impose liability for
acts which are lawful if done by a non-competitor. It would seem that
disparagement is one of those instances. The business community strong-
ly feels that the delicate position of competitor makes it incumbent upon
a seller to remain silent where a third party may, and perhaps should,
speak and criticise with immunity. Most sellers act accordingly. Can
the law afford to ignore this condition?
125. See Federal Trade Commission v. Keppel and Bro., Inc., 291 U. S. 304 (1934)
313.
126. See the case cited note 84, supra, at 228.
127. Reichsgericht II. Z. S. of January 5, 1938, MW 38, 142, 144.
128. See Handler, supra note 1, at 180 and, for an illustration, Citizens Light Co.
v. Montgomery Light Co., 171 Fed. 553, 553 (C. C. M. D. Ala. 1909).
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